Abstract: Ireland and Spain were amongst the European countries which experienced the most severe economic and fiscal problems following the global financial crisis. The proximate causes of these economic crashes have been explored in-depth by researchers and governments, who have highlighted strong parallels between the policy, regulatory and economic factors which underpinned them. In both countries residential property price inflation increased dramatically from the late 1990s driven by increased availability of cheap mortgages but unusually was accompanied by marked growth in new house building. Thus, following the international credit crunch in 2008, a simultaneous contraction in both mortgage credit and house building occurred in Ireland and Spain, which precipitated a marked knock-on decline in the employment, tax revenue and consumer spending which the housing boom had underpinned. This paper argues that the Irish and Spanish housing booms and busts are similar not just in terms of scale and proximate causes but also in terms of fundamental causes. In both countries the housing boom/bust cycle was underpinned by a suite of macroeconomic policies which aimed to use asset price growth to underpin rising demand and economic growth, or in other words achieve what Robert Brenner (2006) terms 'asset-price Keynesianism'. This approach was particularly attractive to the Irish and Spanish governments because it enabled them to resolve historical legacies of industrial underdevelopment and regional imbalances by generating construction jobs in underdeveloped areas. As a result of the latter, local/regional governments in both countries played a key role in facilitating the implementation of this policy.
Introduction:
Ireland and Spain were amongst the European countries which experienced the most severe economic and fiscal problems following the global financial crisis. Ireland's GDP contracted by 15.6 per cent, between 2008 and 2010, Spanish GDP contracted by 5.3 per cent concurrently and tax revenues collapsed in both countries (Eurostat, various years) . The entire Irish banking industry foundered and was almost fully nationalised in 2009. By the end of the following year the State found itself unable to borrow on international markets and was forced to negotiate an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund and the EU and an associated four-year austerity programme, in order to fund public spending and bank recapitalisation (Government of Ireland, 2010) . The short-term impact of crisis was less severe in Spain which did not have to enter a full IMF 'financial stability programme', but was still forced to negotiate a smaller, more targeted package of support from the EU/IMF in order to recapitalise some of its failing banks. The long term impact has arguably been worse and Spain's unemployment rate remains well above Ireland's (López and Rodríguez, 2011) .
The proximate causes of these developments have been explored in-depth by researchers, governments and the international agencies responsible for devising and monitoring the 'bail outs' (e.g., Honohan, 2010; Regling and Watson, 2010; Norris and Coates, 2014, López and Rodríguez, 2011 among many others) and these sources have highlighted strong parallels between the various policy, regulatory and economic factors which underpinned the Irish and Spanish housing booms and busts (Conefrey and Fitz Gerald, 2010; International Monetary Fund, 2015) . In common with many developed countries, residential property price inflation in Ireland and Spain increased dramatically from the late 1990s but, more unusually, this was accompanied by a very large increase in new house building. Thus the Irish and Spanish economies were particularly severely affected when credit availability contracted following the 2008 international credit crunch 2008 because this development precipitated a simultaneous decline in construction and had a marked negative knock-on impact on the employment, tax revenue and consumer spending which the housing boom had underpinned (Norris and Coates, 2014; López and Rodríguez, 2011) . This article argues that the Irish and Spanish housing booms and busts are similar not just in terms of scale, impact and proximate causes but also in terms of fundamental causes. In both countries the housing boom/bust cycle was underpinned by a suite of macroeconomic policies which aimed to use asset price growth (particularly of property which is the most widely held asset) to underpin rising consumer demand and economic growth, or in other words achieve what Robert Brenner (2006) terms 'assetprice Keynesianism' (López and Rodríguez, 2011 also apply this concept to Spain). Brenner (2006) argues that this strategy was employed by the United States as a solution to the widespread decline in the profitability of industry from the late 1960s (separately, Watson (2010) , Crouch (2011) and Prasad (2012) propose similar concepts). Drawing on Brenner's theoretical work, and Lopéz and Rodríguez' analysis of Spain, the argument presented here is that the particularly strong attractions and impact of asset price Keynesianism in Ireland and Spain reflect socio-economic and political factors which are shared by these countries, but not by their more industrially advanced western European neighbours. These factors are: firstly the failure of both Ireland and Spain to achieve significant industrial development during the post-war 'golden age' of economic growth and secondly the spatially imbalanced nature of the industrial growth which was achieved and the regional political tensions it inspired.
Asset-price Keynesianism enabled the Irish and Spanish Governments to compensate for industrial underdevelopment and resolve regional imbalances by generating construction jobs in underdeveloped areas. As a result of the latter, local/regional governments in both countries played a key role in facilitating the implementation of this policy.
The discussion of these issues presented here is organised into five further sections.
The next section summarises and critiques Brenner's (2006) theory of asset price Keynesianism and explores the most notable variations on his ideas which have been offered by other scholars. This is followed by an outline of the anatomy and impact of the Irish and Spanish house price and building booms between the mid-1990s and mid2000s and of the bust which commenced in both countries in 2006-07 and accelerated following the credit crunch in 2008. The next two sections draw together these analyses by examining the macro-economic reforms introduced in both countries which inspired by asset price Keynesianism and the contribution of regional imbalances and sub national government to driving and operationalising this policy. The conclusions identify the key findings and implications of this analysis.
Asset price Keynesianism: Macro-economic impact of housing on aggregate demand: Brenner's (2006) concept of 'Asset price Keynesianism' refers to the centrality of asset price bubbles to the model of accumulation which underpinned economic growth in many developed countries at least from the mid-1990s. He argues that in those countries which experienced property booms during this period (his analysis focusses on the US but could also be applied to the UK, the Netherlands and a number of Baltic States as well as Ireland and Spain), asset price increases particularly in real estate were central to the release of ever-increasing amounts of debt into the economy and, consequently, to increasing consumer demand (López and Rodríguez, 2010; Crouch, 2009; Aalbers and Christophers, forthcoming; Downey, 2014 On the basis of this huge on-paper appreciation of the value of their residencies, households were able to withdraw dramatically increased funds from their home equity -by selling their houses at prices surpassing their mortgage debt, buying new ones, and still having cash left over; by re-financing and increasing the size of their existing mortgages, extracting cash in the process; and by taking out new home equity loans in the form either of second mortgages or lines of credit. If one adds these three sources together, households were able to raise… the astounding sums of 492 billion, 693 billion, and 734 billion dollars respectively, in… 2002 , 2003 , and 2004 (Brenner, 2006 .
Separate to Brenner (2006) a number of other authors offer similar analyses of the increasingly important overall economic role of real estate since the 1970s. For instance, Crouch (2009 Crouch ( , 2011 ) proposes a similar model called 'privatised Keynesianism' which was adopted with more enthusiasm by the English speaking countries which had embraced mainstream Keynesian economics until the 1970s/1980s and were more dependent on consumer spending to support demand.
Privatised Keynesianism was less necessary and therefore less popular in countries such as Germany which relied more on the manufacturing industry and exports to underpin economic growth. Watson's (2010) analysis of the UK offers a similar but more multi-faceted concept called 'house price Keynesianism'. As well as supporting consumer demand he argues that this system has a social function -it was intended to support an 'asset based welfare state' which, by enabling households to accumulate assets such as dwellings which they could liquidate if required, would in part replace the mainstream welfare state. In a variation on this theme Prasad's (2012) longitudinal study of the US welfare system suggests that the asset price Keynesianist model in this country is much older than these other authors imply. She traces the emergence of what she terms 'mortgage Keynesianism' back to the start of government intervention in the US economy in the late 19 th Century. At this time farmers were politically powerful and their lobbing for access to credit which would enable them to invest in machinery and land clearance encouraged government to focus its energies on credit market interventions rather than on providing public services. In Western Europe the public services set up at this time grew into comprehensive welfare states. In the United States government regulation of credit availability introduced in the late 19 th Century expanded into mortgage subsidies and then into efforts to increase credit availability by establishing government sponsored mortgage securitisation agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Prasad's (2012) work therefore indicates that Brenner (2006) , Watson (2010) , Crouch (2009) and many other writers on financialization overstate the novelty and contemporaneousness of government promotion of credit availability and reliance on this source of revenue to drive economic growth. Her longitudinal, multi-faceted and evidence based analysis of the single case of the USA also highlights additional problems in other analyses. One of these relates to the lack of empirical evidence (on for instance the rate, character and distribution of housing debt) which underpins some writing, their failure to consider contrary evidence (for instance the reverse mortgages which many authors consider vital for liquidating housing wealth are not legal in all European countries) and therefore the accuracy of generalisations surrounding the popularity of asset price Keynesianism outside the English speaking world proposed on this basis (European Central Bank, 2009) . Another problem relates to the tendency of Brenner (2006) and Crouch (2009) as political economists to focus strongly on the role of credit availability and to neglect other factors such as housing and planning policy which also influence house prices. Furthermore this genre of analysis has been criticised as 'overly deterministic, assuming both intent and efficacy on the part of the capitalist class' (van der Zwan, 2014: 106). Krippner's (2012) economic history of the United States posits an alternative view of the factors which inspired financialization. She suggests that it was the unintended consequence of a series of policy reforms such as the deregulation of foreign capital flows and interest rates which were introduced in response to the economic and fiscal crises of the 1970s. American policy-makers assumed that capital would always be a scarce resource and were unable to imagine a scenario whereby an oversupply of credit would emerge.
The Irish and Spanish Housing Booms and Busts: Anatomy, Drivers and Impact
Ireland and Spain are distinguished from most of their western European neighbours by economic underperformance in the decades following World War II. Both countries failed to industrialise to any significant extent, due in part to strict adherence to protectionism policies. Consequently they retained economically depressed regions and a much larger rural population for longer than the rest of Europe. Although they enjoyed some economic 'catch up' following trade liberalisation in the 1960s, both suffered badly following the oil price shocks of the 1970s and living standards remained well below the western European average in the 1980s (Tortella, 2000; Kennedy et al, 1988) .
From the 1990s the economies of both countries turned around dramatically and decades of economic stagnation and population decline were replaced by economic and population growth. As detailed in Table 1 Owner occupation rate (%) Ireland n/a n/a n/a n/a 81.8 78 77.3 73.3 69.6
Spain n/a n/a n/a 88 n/a n/a 80.2 79.8 78.9
Population aged 18 and over (millions) Ireland n/a n/a n/a 2885746 3009305 3173018 3374379 3425549 3422850 Spain n/a n/a n/a 33673699 35021216 36280525 37631695 38223380 38460731 Real gross fixed investment in housing (% change year on year)
Ireland n/a n/a n/a 3.7 10.8 3.8 -16 -32.9 -19.5 Spain n/a n/a n/a 6.1 5.2 6.6 -9.1 -11.4 -8.7
Source: European Mortgage Federation (Various Years) and Eurostat (Various Years). Note: * data refer to 18+ population only.
As well as economic and population growth the housing boom in both countries was underpinned by very strong credit growth, albeit from a low base compared to the rest Table 1 ).
The core argument proposed here is that the credit expansion was significant not just as a driver of house price inflation, due in part to rising lending the housing market became the main engine of overall economic growth in Ireland and Spain during the first half of the 2000s. Therefore credit was a key mechanism for achieving asset price
Keynesianism. This effect is particularly evident in Spain where López and Rodríguez an increase which cannot be explained with reference to wages which increased by just 0.7 per cent in the private sector during the property boom (see Palomera, 2013) .
Although wage growth during Ireland's boom was significantly stronger, property prices also served as a significant boost to consumer demand in this country. Between 2005 and 2007, the peak boom years, more than one-third of all loans were housing equity withdrawals, amounting to €5.5 billion per year. According to Downey (2014: 125) this meant that "....a majority [of homeowners] relied on equity release as income and adjusted consumption and expenditure accordingly." Lane (2011: 9) highlights similar evidence in relation to investor demand for dwellings and commercial property, arguing that "[t]he collateral cycle played an important role with rising property prices improving the net worth of domestic investors, which in turn enabled extra leverage and a further impetus to the property market." The increasing value of assets held by households thus translated into a 'wealth effect' which stimulated consumer spending and made for an economy heavily dependent on domestic demand linked to housing and property development (Carballo-Cruz, 2011; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2010; Table 1 Spain compared to only 8 per cent in the EU15 as a whole (see Table 1 (savings banks) was related to construction (López and Rodríguez, 2010) .In order to fund this increased lending, banks in both countries were forced to diversify their revenue beyond the traditional source of retail dependence. Irish banks relied principally on borrowing from other banks on wholesale money markets for this purpose -net borrowing from abroad by Irish banks increased from 10 per cent of GDP in 1999 to over 60 per cent in 2007 (Honohan, 2010) . Spanish banks were among the most energetic users of mortgage securitisation and mortgage covered bonds in the EU.
Spanish securitisations account for almost half of all securitisations in the euro area. At household level the dramatic rise in mortgage debt, particularly during the early 2000s, also generated significant risks because as Table 1 demonstrates the sharp increase in total outstanding mortgage debt in both countries was driven not just by the rising number of loans issued but by also by an increase in the size of loans. Although declining interest rates following Ireland and Spain's accession to membership of the Euro in the late 1990s made these large borrowings more affordable, lenders in both countries found it necessary to employ financial product innovation to further increase affordability. In Ireland the advent of 100 per cent mortgages, longer maturities, and mortgage equity withdrawal products all further inflated house prices and by extension risks for borrowers (Hogan and O'Sullivan, 2007; Doyle, 2009; Norris and Coates, 2014; Downey, 2014) . to 1.6 per cent over the same period) (see Table 1 
National Policy Facilitators of Asset Price Keynesianism
The proceeding section has argued that the Spanish and Irish credit and housebuilding booms acted as key drivers of economic growth during the early 2000s. This section further develops this analysis by examining the extent to which national governments facilitated this asset price Keynesianism through policy reforms. This analysis focusses on policies in the fields of bank regulation, taxation, housing and land use planning policy and, taking account of the critiques of asset price Keynesianism outlined above, examines the extent to which these policy reforms were devised with the explicit intention of facilitating the implementation of this economic model.
Housing Policy
Two elements of national housing policy made a particularly important contribution to facilitating asset price Keynesianism: policies to support private housing provision, particularly home ownership but also private renting in the Irish case and the residualisation of social housing. These policies forced the vast majority of households into the housing market to secure accommodation which, by increasing private ownership of housing assets, in turn enabled the use of asset prices as an economic stimulant (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2010; McCabe, 2011) .
In relation to the latter issue, Ireland devoted significant resources to social house building during the first half of the 20 th Century, but this country also has a long tradition of selling social housing to tenants which dates from the 1930s (Norris and which sanctioned the privatization of social housing stock and largely removed the rent controls which were heretofore widespread in the private rented market (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2010) .
The impact of these reforms in terms of pushing households into the private housing market was reinforced by 'pull factors' which increased the attractiveness of this sector.
In Spain the Boyer Decree introduced generous universal tax subsidies for home ownership which helped to increase the size of this tenure from 64 per cent in 1971 to 87 per cent in 2007 (Rodríguez and López, 2011) . In Ireland universal mortgage interest relief was reduced during the 1980s and 1990s but many supports for lowincome home buyers were put in place which enabled this cohort of the population to access the housing market (Norris, Coates and Kane, 2007) . However, as evidenced by the fact during the economic boom the number of households living in private rented accommodation grew for the first time since records began, exchequer subsidies for this sector were also important. Historically private renting was not was not subsidised in
Ireland but this changed in the late 1970s when housing allowances (called rent supplement) were introduced to pay the rent of benefit dependent private renters and then in 1986 tax incentives to subsidise the construction and refurbishment of private rented accommodation in run down neighbourhoods (popularly known as Section 23 incentives) were introduced. Neither of these measures was formally intended to support investment in private renting (rent supplement was a cheaper, more flexible alternative to social housing and Section 23 was a neighbourhood regeneration scheme) but they had that effect in practice.
Bank Regulation and Finance
Changing policy on the regulation of banks and mortgage lenders also facilitated rising credit availability and therefore rising prices in both Ireland and Spain. In Ireland this development commenced in the early 1980s and was driven by two factors:
European Union membership which required the removal of barriers to national and international competition in the banking sector and the severe fiscal crisis which inspired the government to withdraw from its role as the dominant provider of mortgages to low-income households (on the grounds that these were included in the then very large national debt) and encourage commercial banks to fill this gap in provision. Thus during the 1980s Ireland's home mortgage finance system was almost entirely marketised as government mortgages fell from one third to less than one per cent of provision, the commercial banking sector was deregulated (quantitative restrictions on credit growth were abolished; banks' reserve requirement ratios lowered; capital controls dismantled and restrictions on interest rates withdrawn) and legal barriers to the conversion of building societies into banks were removed (Norris, forthcoming) . Similar deregulation of banking and mortgage lending happened somewhat later in Spain also driven in part by EU requirements alongside the introduction of legislation in 1992 which legalised the creation of mortgage securitisation funds (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia Herrero, 2008) .
These policies had the effect of facilitating the radical credit growth outlined in the opening sections of this paper and by extension asset price Keynesianism, but clarifying the extent to which these reforms were deliberately designed for this purpose is (Conefrey and Fitz Gerald, 2010; Observatorio Metropolitano, 2012) . EMU also resulted in low and predictable interest rates across the Eurozone which encouraged increased borrowing in countries including Ireland and Spain where mortgage interest rates had historically been high and volatile while at the same time national central banks lost control over interest rates which might have helped to control housing demand (Carballo-Cruz 2011;
Fernandez de Lis and Garia Herrero, 2008) . Irrespective of whether mortgage market liberalisation was designed with a view to facilitating asset-price Keynesianism or not, once it had been introduced, the Irish and Spanish governments clearly felt that the advantages of its impact outweighed the disadvantages, because during their housing booms neither government used the regulatory instruments which were available to control credit growth, such as imposing minimum deposit requirements or maximum loan to value ratios (Honohan, 2010) .
Land Use Planning and Infrastructure Policy
In contrast to bank regulation and finance there is no doubt that the reforms to land use planning and infrastructure policy in Ireland and Spain during the late 1990s and early 2000s were intended to facilitate increased construction in order to underpin economic growth and also curtail property price inflation. This was particularly obvious in Spain where the Land Act 1998 (frequently referred to as the 'build anywhere Act') changed the planning system to effectively zone huge swathes of land as suitable for development (Burriel, 2011; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2010; Coq-Huelva, 2013 ). This development was rationalised on the basis that increased supply of development land would reduce costs, but in fact land values continued to rise after 1998 (Burriel, 2011) . In Ireland the national legislative framework which underpinned its (traditionally very weak and permissive) land use planning system was tightened up by the Planning and Development Act, 2000. However the implementation of this legislation continued to facilitate rather than inhibit development. This tendency is evident from the government's response to a series of economic analyses of the housing market which it commissioned in the late 1990s (Bacon and Associates 1998 , 1999 . These reports identified under supply of dwellings as a key driver of price inflation and practically all of their recommendations to boost output by increasing density of development, investing in the necessary infrastructure and employing more planners were implemented by government (see Department of the Environment and Local Government 1998 , 1999 . One the other hand, the relatively modest taxation measures the reports recommended to discourage residential landlords from buying dwellings were shelved following campaigns by property industry representatives (Norris and Shiels 2007) .
During the Irish and Spanish property booms very high exchequer investment in physical infrastructure facilitated the increased house building and also further reinforced the concentration of economic resources in the construction sector. In Spain the 1991 Plan Director de Infraestructuras initiated a long period of significant public infrastructure investment; which reached 1.9 -2.7 per cent of GDP annually between motorways and other forms of transport (e.g. high -speed trains) which enabled further urbanization and rising land values. This is particularly evident in the formerly rural areas around Madrid, which had the highest levels of housing output of anywhere in Spain (Burriel, 2011; De Santiago, 2011) . In Ireland, EU Cohesion Funds contributed over €1 billion to infrastructure projects between 1993 and 2002, much of which financed motorways and road networks generally (Bannon, 2004) . Ironically, perhaps, while EU infrastructure funding in Ireland and Spain was designed to overcome regional imbalances within Europe, to an extent it reinforced both countries' dependency on real estate as land prices absorbed the added value brought by motorways, public transport and high speed train networks.
Local Policy Facilitators of Asset Price Keynesianism
Ostensibly at least the organisational context for operationalising asset price Keynesianism at sub-national level differs significantly between Ireland and Spain. The former country has one of the most centralised systems of government in the EU -it lacks any meaningful system of regional government and local government (city and county councils) has very limited fund raising powers and responsibilities (Callanan and Keogan, 2003) . In contrast, Spanish regional government (the autonomous communities) is very powerful in terms of responsibilities and tax raising powers and local level municipalities (city councils) are less powerful but are also important providers of public services. Notwithstanding these organisational differences however, due to a number of shared political and financial factors sub national government in both countries played a key role in driving the house building and to a lesser extent the credit booms and thereby to enabling the implementation asset price Keynesianism.
Sub-National Government Finance
In 
Sub-National Growth Coalitions
The Cajas de Horro were, however, but one part of local 'growth coalitions' which drove construction and property speculation at a local level in Ireland and Spain (Burriel, 2009; Coq Huelva, 2013, Lopez and Rodriguez, 2010) . These coalitions were brought together by the factors already mentioned: local administrative powers in relation to planning and urbanisation, local fiscal dependency on development, and 'golden circles' linking financial institutions to political decision makers (Coq Huleva, 2013; Jimenez, 2009 ), but they also involved local economic interests and corruption (Jimenez, 2009; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011; Kitchen, et al 2010) . This combination of factors served to foster strong 'pro-growth' agendas in Spanish cities which conflated construction and the jobs it generated with the public good and as a result that it became extraordinarily difficult to oppose new developments (Burriel, 2011) . Similarly 
Regional Imbalances
A key characteristic of the sub national facilitators of asset price Keynesianism described above is that they did not operate in a spatially even fashion in Ireland and
Spain. As economic logic would dictate, housing output was very high in the urban growth centres in both countries (Madrid and Barcelona in Spain; Dublin and Galway in Ireland) but, contrary to economic logic, building was also very high in economically and demographically weaker regions (the rural western seaboard of Ireland and Andalucía and Valencia in Spain) (Kitchen, et al, 2010; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011 landowners and the development industry, regarding zoning decisions" as a key driver of unbalanced development. They report that "In existing urban areas, this pressure usually restricts housing supply (as the wishes of existing residents are the key political consideration), whilst in peripheral areas (where land owners are more influential) it often facilitates the zoning of land for development" (Norris and Shiels, 2007: 63) .
Moreover, in Spain an inter-urban competitive dynamic emerged whereby each municipality sought to attract as much development over and above their neighbouring rivals (Burriel, 2011) . This mania finally led to absurd situations, most notably that of Valencia where, across the regions' 53 municipalities, levels of development were sanctioned that would have provided for a fivefold population increase (Burriel, 2011) .The influence of these political factors was reinforced by the spatially uneven impact of financial incentives which encouraged local government to facilitate development. In Ireland rural local authorities had lower income from business rates than their urban counterparts and therefore a greater reliance on highly restrictive central government funding and a stronger incentive to facilitate commercial property development in order to increase their business rates income.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the housing booms which occurred in Ireland and Spain between the mid-1990s and early-2000s and the busts which commenced in 2006-07 and argued that these developments were similar not just in terms of scale, impact and proximate causes but also in terms of fundamental causes. In both countries the housing boom/bust cycles were not merely sectoral phenomena, rather the housing market acted as the main engine of overall economic growth particularly the first half of the 2000s. This asset price Keynesianist effect was underpinned by a suite of policies which enabled asset price growth to underpin rising consumer demand and economic growth (Brenner, 2006) .
Unlike other writers who have proposed similar analyses of the recent political economy of developed countries (Brenner, 2006; Watson, 2010; Crouch, 2011; Prasad 2012 ) the analysis presented in this paper has emphasised the way in which mortgage credit expansion drove economic growth by facilitating increased construction as well as increased consumer demand. Also in contravention of the consensus view, the authors have argued that not all of the policy reforms which facilitated asset-price Keynesianism were designed with this intention in mind (or at least that the probability of this outcome was not entirely evident when these reforms were initiated) and that the political economy of these developments must be conceptualised at a variety of spatial scales. This paper has focussed on the contribution of national policy and Ireland and Spain, served as an important target for lending and investment from financial institutions in the core European countries (Hadjmichalis, 2011; O'Riain, 2014; Observatorio Metropolitano, 2012) , a dynamic made possible by the integration of the EU and Eurozone, ECB monetary policies and the associated uneven development of Europe (Hadjmichalis, 2011) .
Also for reasons of space this paper has focussed on contemporary socio-economic and political drivers of policies to facilitate asset-based Keynesianism such as regional under development, lack of industrialisation and the financing system for local government. However, as Prasad's (2012) longitudinal study of mortgage Keynesianism in the United States demonstrates, the roots of this policy approach are much older than many other authors imply and this is also the case in Ireland and Spain.
Governments in both countries have very long traditions of using real estate and construction as economic stimuli and to achieve social objectives and in many ways asset-price welfare was a logical development of these practices.
The economic legacy Spain's failure to industrialise in the years after World War II was finally resolved in the 1960s when government decided to use on mass tourism and the property development it required as generators of economic growth and employment (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2010; Coq-Huelva, 2013) . In Spain, as in many other countries, government has a long history of subsidising promoting home ownership on the grounds that it acted as an alternative to providing mainstream welfare and mediated class conflict (Harvey, 2012) . The latter role was particularly important during this country's thirty year period of dictatorship and José Luis Arrese, a
Franco-era Minster for Housing famously put it, "we want a nation of the propertied, not the proletariat" (cited in Lopez and Rodrigez, 2011) . By the 1970s Spain had transitioned from a nation of renters to a nation of home owners, in which 60 per cent of dwellings were owner occupied, the removal of strict controls on privet rents in the early 1980s entirely marketised the housing system and provided an ideal context in which to implement asset based welfare (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011) .
Irish governments have an even stronger tradition of subsidising house building and home ownership via support for social house building, grants and tax subsidies for home owners and provision of mortgages and these subsidies provided an important economic stimulus in the context of chronic labour over-supply. Norris (forthcoming: 65) reports that "By the mid-1950s the United Nations (1958) calculated that state housing subsidies in Ireland where the highest among 15 western European countries examined both in terms of the proportion of housing capital derived from the exchequer (75%) and of new dwellings which received public subsidies (97%)". However by the 1980s this subsidy regime proved unaffordable in the context of a severe fiscal crisis and the State withdrew from its role as a major mortgage lender and cuts its grants and tax subsidies for house building. Deregulating the commercial lending sector during this period ensured that banks would fulfil this role of supporting real estate and borrowings. Thus in Ireland asset-price Keynesianism was a logical replacement for the more mainstream Keynesianist government subsidisation of property development employed in previous decades.
